Pareto Improving Social Security Reform When Financial Markets Are Incomplete

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5039

Authors: Dirk Krueger; Felix Kübler

Abstract: This paper studies an overlapping generations model with stochastic production and incomplete markets to assess whether the introduction of an unfunded social security system leads to a Pareto improvement. When returns to capital and wages are imperfectly correlated a system that endows retired households with claims to labour income enhances the sharing of aggregate risk between generations. Our quantitative analysis shows that, abstracting from the capital crowding-out effect, the introduction of social security represents a Pareto improving reform, even when the economy is dynamically efficient. However, the severity of the crowding-out effect in general equilibrium tends to overturn these gains.

Keywords: Aggregate fluctuations; Incomplete markets; Intergenerational risk sharing; Social security reform

JEL Codes: D58; D91; E62; H31; H55


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
social security (H55)welfare (I38)
capital crowding out (E62)welfare (I38)
social security (H55)intergenerational risk sharing (D15)
intergenerational risk sharing (D15)welfare (I38)
capital crowding out + social security (E62)welfare (I38)
risk aversion (D81)welfare gains from social security (H55)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (D15)welfare gains from social security (H55)

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