Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP5007
Authors: Guy Laroque; Bernard Salani
Abstract: There has been little empirical work evaluating the sensitivity of fertility to financial incentives at the household level. We put forward an identification strategy that relies on the fact that variation of wages induces variation in benefits and tax credits among 'comparable' households. We implement this approach by estimating a discrete choice model of female participation and fertility, using individual data from the French Labor Force Survey and a fairly detailed representation of the French tax-benefit system. Our results suggest that financial incentives play a notable role in determining fertility decisions in France, both for the first and for the third child. As an example, an unconditional child benefit with a direct cost of 0:3% of GDP might raise total fertility by about 0:3 point.
Keywords: Benefits; Fertility; Incentives; Population
JEL Codes: H53; J13; J22
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| financial incentives (e) (M52) | fertility (f) (J13) |
| net discounted household income (r) (D15) | financial incentives (e) (M52) |
| woman's wage (w) (J31) | net discounted household income (r) (D15) |
| financial incentives (e) (M52) | cost of raising children (c) (J13) |
| cost of raising children (c) (J13) | fertility (f) (J13) |