Can We Trust Private Firms as Suppliers of Vaccines for the Avian Influenza?

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4980

Abstract: Using a simple monopoly model, this note analyses the incentives of a vaccine producer. Because a vaccine tends to eradicate the disease for which it is intended, it also tends to destroy its own market. This means that monopolistic producers may be tempted, in a socially non-optimal way, to delay the introduction of vaccines against new infections until the disease has spread.

Keywords: vaccines

JEL Codes: D42; D62; H10; I18; L10

Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.

Causal Claims

Cause	Effect
Monopolistic producers (D42)	socially suboptimal delay in vaccine introduction (I14)

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