Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4954
Authors: Richard Baldwin; Mika Widgrn
Abstract: In this paper, we evaluate the impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting. The aspects that we discuss are decision-making efficiency and the distribution of power in the EU's leading decision making body the Council of Ministers. We compare two alternative Council voting rules: those accepted in the Treaty of Nice and implemented by the Accession Treaty of ten 2004 entrants and the rules that are laid down in the Constitutional Treaty.
Keywords: constitutional treaty; EU; Turkey; voting
JEL Codes: C71; D71; F02
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Turkey's membership (F55) | decision-making efficiency (D91) |
| Turkey's membership (F55) | distribution of power within the EU (F55) |
| Turkey's membership (F55) | power dynamics within the EU (F55) |