Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4951
Authors: Chen Cohen; Aner Sela
Abstract: We study asymmetric all-pay auctions with multiple objects where players? values for the objects are common knowledge. The players have different values for the objects but they have the same ranking. The contest designer may award one prize including all the objects to the player with the highest bid, or, alternatively, they may allocate several prizes, each prize including one object such that the first prize is awarded to the player with the highest bid, the second prize to the player with the second-highest bid, and so on until all the objects are allocated. We analyse the distribution of effort in one-prize and multiple-prize contests and show that allocation of several prizes may be optimal for a contest designer who maximizes the total effort.
Keywords: auctions; contests
JEL Codes: D44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| allocation of multiple prizes (D44) | higher expected total effort (D29) |
| different valuations for objects (D46) | higher expected total effort when multiple prizes are allocated (C78) |
| contest designer's choice (C52) | player outcomes (Z22) |
| number of prizes allocated (D44) | distribution of effort (D30) |
| number of prizes allocated (D44) | probabilities of winning (C25) |
| allocation of multiple prizes (D44) | manipulation of winners' identity (C90) |