Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4736
Authors: Raphael Franck; Arye L. Hillman; Miriam Krausz
Abstract: The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population?s response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.
Keywords: Counterterrorism; Defense Economics; Defensive Preemption; International Judges; Profiling and Terror
JEL Codes: D81; H56
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| ideological beliefs (P16) | likelihood of terrorist actions (H56) |
| screening rule (r) (R50) | likelihood of type I and type II errors (C12) |
| screening rule (r) (R50) | safety of the vpopulation (J28) |
| screening rule (r) (R50) | welfare of innocent civilians (I30) |
| moral dilemma (A13) | screening rule (r) (R50) |
| screening rule (r) (R50) | collective punishment of innocents (D70) |