Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4734
Authors: John Asker; Estelle Cantillon
Abstract: This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour in scoring auctions when suppliers? private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behaviour and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.
Keywords: auction; multiattribute; multidimensional; private information; procurement
JEL Codes: D44; L14; L24
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| scoring auction (D44) | improved outcomes (I14) |
| scoring auction (D44) | efficiency (D61) |
| scoring auction (D44) | social welfare (I38) |
| scoring auction (D44) | price-only auctions (D44) |
| multidimensional private information (D82) | scoring auction (D44) |
| scoring auction (D44) | menu auctions (D44) |
| scoring auction (D44) | single-bid auctions (D44) |