Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4489
Authors: John List; Daniel Sturm
Abstract: In this Paper we explore to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives. We develop a political agency model in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue, such as the level of public spending, and a secondary policy issue, such as environmental policy. The model shows under which conditions the incumbent finds it worthwhile to manipulate the secondary policy to attract additional votes to their platform. We test the predictions of the model using state-level panel data on Gubernatorial environmental policy choices over the years 1960-2000. In contrast to the popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives on environmental policy.
Keywords: elections; environmental policy; lobbying; term limits
JEL Codes: D72; H72; Q58
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral context (e.g., number of voters affected by environmental policy) (D72) | Environmental policy choices (Q58) |
| Term limits (K16) | Environmental policy choices (Q58) |
| Composition of state's population (J11) | Impact of term limits on environmental policy (F64) |
| Political competition (D72) | Manipulation of environmental policies (Q58) |
| Term limits (K16) | Environmental spending (Q56) |