Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4450
Authors: Richard Baldwin; Mika Widgrn
Abstract: This Paper studies some of the many options facing EU leaders when choosing a viable voting system for the EU25+. It provides quantitative estimates of the efficiency and power distributions of the various EU voting schemes that are being considered. It also provides intuition on how various aspects of voting rules affect decision-making efficiency and the implied power distribution. The paper also argues that the two big mistakes the EU has made with respect to voting reform were both due to last-minute ?surprise? schemes. This time around, EU leaders should limit themselves to choosing among voting systems that have been thoroughly studied and discussed, if they want to avoid a third mistake on this issue.
Keywords: Council of Ministers; European Convention; European Union; Voting Power
JEL Codes: D70; D71; F15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| mainstream dual majority schemes (D79) | decision-making efficiency (D91) |
| mainstream dual majority schemes (D79) | power distribution (D39) |
| dual majority systems (D72) | power distribution (implicit in Nice treaty's voting scheme) (F55) |
| dual majority system of 60% membership and 50% population (D72) | near-great power status of Spain and Poland (N93) |
| tightening membership threshold (D71) | power shift from larger to smaller nations (F52) |
| tightening population threshold (J11) | power shift from smaller to larger nations (F52) |
| even duals (Y40) | cut power of larger nations and raise power of smallest nations (F55) |
| flawed Nice voting system (D72) | improve decision-making efficiency (D91) |