Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4400
Authors: Jos Manuel Campa; Ignacio Hernando
Abstract: This Paper looks at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement of mergers and acquisitions involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998-2000. Cumulative abnormal shareholder returns due to the announcement of a merger reflect a revision of the expected value resulting from future synergies or wealth redistribution among stakeholders. Target firm shareholders receive on average a statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 9% in a one-month window centred on the announcement date. Acquirers? cumulative abnormal returns are null on average. When distinguishing in terms of the geographical and sectoral dimensions of the merger deals, our main finding is that mergers in industries that had previously been under government control or that are still heavily regulated generate lower value than M&A announcements in unregulated industries. This low value creation in regulated industries becomes significantly negative when the merger involves two firms from different countries and is primarily due to the lower positive return that shareholders of the target firm enjoy upon the announcement of the merger. This evidence is consistent with the existence of obstacles (such as cultural, legal, or transaction barriers) to the successful conclusion of this type of transaction, which lessen the probability of the merger actually being completed as announced and, therefore, reduce its expected value.
Keywords: Europe; Event Study; Mergers and Acquisitions
JEL Codes: G34; G38; L44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (G34) | Shareholder value creation (G34) |
| Target firm shareholders (G34) | Cumulative abnormal return (C22) |
| Acquirers (G34) | Average cumulative abnormal returns (C29) |
| Regulated industries (K23) | Shareholder value (G32) |
| Cross-border mergers (F23) | Shareholder value (G32) |
| Cultural, legal, and transaction barriers (F69) | Expected value of the merger (G34) |
| Cultural, legal, and transaction barriers (F69) | Target firm returns (L21) |