Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4367
Authors: Ulrich Bindseil; Kjell G. Nyborg; Ilya Strebulaev
Abstract: Repo auctions are multiunit auctions regularly used by central banks to inject liquidity into the banking sector. Banks have a fundamental need to participate because they have to satisfy reserve requirements. Superficially, repo auctions resemble treasury auctions; the format and rules are similar and there is an active secondary market for the underlying asset. Using a bidder level dataset of the European Central Bank?s main repo auctions, however, we find evidence that the economic issues in repo auctions may be very different. Unlike what has been documented in the treasury auctions literature, we find no evidence that private information and the winner?s curse are important issues. Instead our findings suggest that bidders are more concerned with the loser?s nightmare, collateral, and future interest rate reductions by the ECB. Small and large bidders use different strategies, with large bidders performing better.
Keywords: central bank; collateral; losers nightmare; money markets; multiunit auctions; open market operations; repo auctions; reserve requirements
JEL Codes: D44; E43; E50; G12; G21
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| volatility in the interbank market (E44) | bidders shade their bids less (D44) |
| volatility in the interbank market (E44) | underpricing decreases (D41) |
| auction size (D44) | cautious bidding (D44) |
| minimum bid rate (E43) | overall demand in the auctions (D44) |
| large bidders (D44) | lower borrowing rates (G21) |
| losers nightmare (Y70) | bidders more concerned about satisfying liquidity needs (D44) |