Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4331
Authors: Gadi Fibich; Arieh Gavious; Aner Sela
Abstract: We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.
Keywords: asymmetric auctions; asymptotic methods; collusion; large auctions; revenue equivalence; risk-averse bidders
JEL Codes: D44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders or risk-averse bidders (D44) | revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions (D44) |