Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4298
Authors: Jan Boone; Abdolkarim Sadrieh; Jan C. van Ours
Abstract: This Paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effects of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effects that discourage the unemployed from risking benefit sanctions (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefits sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment.
Keywords: experiments; job search; sanctions; unemployment benefits
JEL Codes: C91; J64; J65
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| benefit sanctions (J32) | job search behavior (J68) |
| threat of sanctions (F51) | job search behavior (J68) |
| threat of sanctions (F51) | behaviors risking benefits (D91) |
| benefit sanctions (J32) | outflow from unemployment (J65) |