Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4297
Authors: Joseph Francois; Gunnar Niels
Abstract: We examine the role of political factors in Mexico?s anti-dumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to anti-dumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on anti-dumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the US and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.
Keywords: antidumping; endogenous import protection; endogenous tariffs; mexico; political economy of trade policy
JEL Codes: F10; F13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| political influence (D72) | outcome of antidumping investigations (F18) |
| GATT/WTO membership (F13) | outcome of antidumping investigations (F18) |
| timing of investigations (C41) | outcome of antidumping investigations (F18) |
| firm size (L25) | antidumping protection (F18) |
| nature of goods (L60) | outcome of antidumping investigations (F18) |
| legal frameworks (K40) | supply of antidumping protection (F18) |