Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4245

Authors: Helmut Bester; Kai A. Konrad

Abstract: Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

Keywords: easy targets; timing of conflict; war

JEL Codes: B31; D74; H77


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
stronger party (D72)war initiation (H56)
weaker party being weak (D79)war initiation (H56)
low resources of weaker rival (D74)low cost for stronger rival to initiate conflict (D74)
decision to delay conflict (D74)more favorable conditions (P17)

Back to index