Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4169
Authors: Neal Stoughton; Josef Zechner
Abstract: This Paper analyses firms? capital allocation decisions when optimal capital structure is linked to the risk of underlying assets and when equity capital is costly and cannot be raised instantaneously. In the model, division managers receive private information and authority is delegated to them over risky project choices. The optimal mechanisms are related to EVA compensation and RAROC performance measurement systems. In the optimal mechanism, position limits will be employed but are not always completely utilized. Hurdle rates reflect capital allocation through a division-specific capital structure. In the multidivisional context the optimal capital allocation mechanism incorporates valuable externalities leading to overall firm EVA maximization.
Keywords: banking; capital budgeting; financial institutions; investment policy
JEL Codes: G00; G20; G21; G30; G31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| optimal capital allocation mechanisms (D61) | EVA maximization (C61) |
| internal price for economic capital (G19) | EVA maximization (C61) |
| risk management processes (G22) | capital budgeting processes (G31) |
| risk limits (G33) | investment decisions (G11) |
| distortions in investment policy (F21) | external opportunities available to division managers (L19) |
| RAROC hurdle rates (G19) | capital allocation decisions (G31) |