Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4131
Authors: Winand Emons
Abstract: Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. Even if an agent is law abiding, they may still commit the act accidentally. The agents are wealth constrained. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. If the benefit from the crime is small, the optimal sanction scheme is decreasing in the number of offenses. In contrast, if the benefit is large, sanctions are increasing in the number of offenses. Increasing sanctions do not make the criminal track less attractive; they make honesty more attractive.
Keywords: Crime; Punishment; Repeat Offenders
JEL Codes: D82; K41; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| high benefit from crime (K42) | high probability of apprehension (K42) |
| high probability of apprehension (K42) | escalating penalties for repeat offenders (K42) |
| escalating penalties for repeat offenders (K42) | more attractive lawful behavior (K40) |
| low benefit from crime (K42) | low probability of apprehension (K42) |
| low probability of apprehension (K42) | decreasing sanctions (F51) |
| decreasing sanctions (F51) | less attractive criminal behavior (K42) |
| government's strategy (H12) | adjust sanctions based on perceived benefits of crime and probability of apprehension (K42) |
| agents' wealth, benefits of crime, enforcement costs (K42) | interplay affects sanction effectiveness (F51) |