Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4113
Authors: Nuno Garoupa; Frank Stephen
Abstract: The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this Paper we show that legal aid can be part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error, both guilty and innocent individuals are better off because the marginal cost of defense expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence.
Keywords: legal aid; sanction; self-reporting
JEL Codes: K40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Legal Aid (K36) | Reduction in Marginal Cost of Defense Expenditure (H56) |
| Reduction in Marginal Cost of Defense Expenditure (H56) | Benefits to Guilty and Innocent Individuals (K40) |
| Legal Aid (K36) | Enhanced Deterrence (K42) |
| Legal Aid (K36) | Offset Welfare Diminishing Effects of Increased Defense Expenditure (H56) |
| Legal Aid (K36) | Decreased Likelihood of Plea Bargaining (K41) |
| Legal Aid (K36) | Inequality in Deterrence among Income Groups (D31) |
| Legal Aid (K36) | Positive Impact on Deterrence (K42) |