Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4035
Authors: Antoine Faure-Grimaud; Soenje Reiche
Abstract: This Paper shows that the inability of regulators to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when there is some competition between regulated firms and when firms? private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamic of regulation without such competition. The Paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long-term contracts. We found that the inability of a regulator to commit to not renegotiating long-term contracts is without consequences even if there is a bound on transfers that a firm can be asked to pay. In contrast, short-term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers. Second, absent current competition, the possibility of future entry allows the regulator to implement the first-best with a renegotiation-proof long-term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short-term contracting.
Keywords: commitment; ratchet effect; short and long-term contracts; yardstick regulation
JEL Codes: D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Competition among regulated firms (L10) | Regulatory effectiveness (L51) |
| Correlated private information (D89) | Regulatory outcomes (L51) |
| Short-term contracts with correlated mechanisms (D86) | Efficient regulatory outcomes (G18) |
| Future entry threats (Y50) | Regulatory efficiency (G18) |
| Inability to commit to long-term contracts (D86) | Hindered regulatory outcomes (L51) |