Incentives in the Public Sector: Some Preliminary Evidence from a UK Government Agency

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4010

Authors: Simon Burgess; Carol Propper; Marisa Ratto; Emma Tominey

Abstract: This Paper evaluates the impact of a team-based incentive scheme piloted in the public sector agency, Jobcentre Plus. The way the scheme has been designed raises many questions for which theory makes predictions. We test these predictions against our data. We find that team size affects the impact of the incentive scheme upon performance. Moreover, while the measure of quantity increased in incentivized areas, no improvement was found for the two quality measures. This may reflect concerns related to multi-tasking issues, or may reflect the small sample size available for the quality analysis. Finally, the data suggests that employees participating in the incentive scheme aim to exert a level of effort to ensure the target is achieved, but as additional effort is not rewarded they aim not to exceed this limit.

Keywords: incentives; performance; public sector; teams

JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
team size (L25)impact of the incentive scheme (M52)
impact of the incentive scheme (M52)performance (D29)
team size (L25)free riding behavior (H40)
incentive scheme (J33)effort exerted by workers (J22)
effort exerted by workers (J22)performance metrics (C52)
complexity of the incentive scheme (D82)focus on easily measurable tasks (L25)

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