Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4009
Authors: Gadi Fibich; Arieh Gavious; Aner Sela
Abstract: We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.
Keywords: interdependent values; perturbation analysis; weakly asymmetric auctions
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| asymmetry of bidders' valuations (D44) | expected revenue in auctions (D44) |
| weak asymmetry (F12) | expected revenue in second-price auctions (D44) |
| expected revenue in second-price auctions (D44) | revenue in symmetric auctions (D44) |
| aggregation of asymmetry of bidders' valuation functions (D44) | expected revenue (H27) |
| valuation functions (D46) | equilibrium strategies in auctions (D44) |