Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP4004
Authors: Michael Mandler; Michael Spagat
Abstract: A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertain whether the domestic power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the home government will commit more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power?s control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East illustrate the models.
Keywords: Civil conflict; Foreign aid; Human rights; Paramilitaries; Signalling; Terrorist atrocities
JEL Codes: D74; D82; N40
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| foreign aid aimed at reducing terrorist atrocities (F35) | increase in terrorist atrocities (H84) |
| domestic power establishes paramilitaries (P26) | evasion of human rights conditions attached to foreign aid (F35) |
| paramilitaries established (O17) | domestic power cannot lower level of atrocities (H84) |
| foreign patron provides aid (F35) | increase in probability of victory for domestic power (F52) |
| domestic power prefers existence of paramilitaries (F52) | increase in overall violence (H56) |
| foreign patron's reluctance to be implicated in human rights abuses (P14) | greater violence (D74) |
| domestic powers escalating atrocities (H84) | maintain appearance of paramilitary independence (H56) |