Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3948
Authors: Gilat Levy
Abstract: In this Paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations, as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court?s decision reveals whether the judge interpreted properly the law and allows the evaluator to assess the judge?s ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge?s decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to inefficiently contradict previous decisions. I also show that such judges behave more efficiently when elected by the public than when appointed by fellow superior judges.
Keywords: career concerns; judicial decision-making
JEL Codes: D72; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Judges with career concerns (K40) | Inefficiently contradict previous decisions (D80) |
| Judges' desire to signal ability to evaluators (D79) | Inefficiently contradict previous decisions (D80) |
| Possibility of appeals (K41) | Judges' desire to signal ability to evaluators (D79) |
| Judges appointed by fellow judges (K40) | Inefficiently contradict previous decisions (D80) |
| Judges elected by the public (K16) | More efficient behavior (D21) |
| Endogenous monitoring from public scrutiny (D73) | Higher likelihood of being penalized for contradicting previous decisions (D91) |
| Judges' career aspirations (K40) | Higher rate of reversals when contradicting established precedents (D91) |