Incentives to Borrow and the Demand for Mortgage Debt: An Analysis of Tax Reforms

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3903

Authors: Tullio Jappelli; Luigi Pistaferri

Abstract: Before 1992 mortgage interest in Italy was fully tax deductible up to 3,500 euro (7,000 for two cosigners). Between 1992-94 the government implemented a series of tax reforms whose ultimate effect was to cancel the relation between the after-tax mortgage rate and the marginal tax rate. Using data from the 1987-2000 Survey of Household Income and Wealth we test if the cancellation of incentives has reduced the propensity to borrow of high-income taxpayers relative to the other population groups. Difference-in-differences estimates and regression analysis indicate that tax considerations have not affected the demand for mortgage debt, either at the extensive or intensive margin.

Keywords: borrowing; mortgage debt; tax incentives

JEL Codes: D91; H20


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Tax reforms (H29)Mortgage borrowing (G21)
Cancellation of tax incentives for high-income taxpayers (H26)Propensity to borrow (G51)
Tax reforms (H29)Propensity to borrow for low-income taxpayers (H31)
Tax reforms (H29)Amount borrowed by low-income taxpayers (H74)
Tax reforms (H29)Amount borrowed by high-income taxpayers (G51)

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