Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3886
Authors: Georges Casamatta; Wilfried Zantman
Abstract: We extend a simple version of the citizen candidates model (developed by Osborne-Slivinsky (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to three. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low.
Keywords: Information; Political Competition; Political Economy
JEL Codes: D72; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| entry costs (L11) | candidate behavior (D79) |
| status quo (C62) | candidate behavior (D79) |
| entry costs + status quo (L11) | candidate types entering (D79) |
| status quo proximity to median policy (R28) | candidate types entering (D79) |
| status quo + types' preferences (C69) | candidate types entering (D79) |