Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3800
Authors: Jean-Marie Baland; James A. Robinson
Abstract: We study the implications of electoral corruption for resource allocation, factor market equilibrium and inequality. We focus on the control of the voting of agricultural workers by landlords and show that if the employment relationship is subject to moral hazard then the resulting rents conceded by employers give them a comparative advantage in controlling the political activities of their workers. This generates an added incentive to own land and leads to inefficiently high land concentration. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958.
Keywords: employment; inequality; land; productivity
JEL Codes: D72; O12; Q15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| electoral corruption (K16) | inefficiently high land concentration (R14) |
| landlords controlling votes (R21) | inefficiently high land concentration (R14) |
| employment relationship (M51) | political influence (D72) |
| introduction of secret ballot in 1958 (K16) | decrease in land concentration (Q15) |
| introduction of secret ballot in 1958 (K16) | reduction in support for right-wing parties (D72) |
| land concentration before reform (Q15) | support for right-wing parties (D72) |
| decrease in land concentration (Q15) | reduction in support for right-wing parties (D72) |