Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3784
Authors: Helmut Bester; Kai A. Konrad
Abstract: Why is there delay in contests? In this Paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of Carl von Clausewitz to explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate, and if the additional cost of investment in future strength is low.
Keywords: conflict; contest; delay
JEL Codes: B31; D74; H77
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| asymmetry between defense and attack (D74) | decision to delay (D91) |
| expected change in relative strengths is moderate (C59) | decision to delay (D91) |
| low cost of investing in future strength (G31) | decision to delay (D91) |
| asymmetry between defense and attack (D74) | delay in conflict (D74) |
| expected future strength (F17) | current strategic choices (L21) |
| costs associated with investment in military strength (H56) | timing of conflict resolution (D74) |