Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3668
Authors: Tomer Blumkin; Mark Gradstein
Abstract: Employing the canonical political agency model, this Paper studies the incentives of the government to provide high-quality services by reducing corruption. Acting as a principal in a moral hazard framework, the public disciplines the incumbent by replacing him if the generated output is unsatisfactorily low. The implications of the model indicate the importance of transparency, of the media, and of political contestability for taming corruption. The existing empirical evidence is shown to broadly support these conclusions.
Keywords: democracy; political corruption; transparency
JEL Codes: D72; D78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increased transparency (G38) | decreased corruption (H57) |
| low transparency (L15) | increased corruption (D73) |
| less democratic systems (D72) | higher levels of corruption (D73) |
| media concentration (L82) | higher levels of corruption (D73) |
| competitive media landscape (L82) | decreased corruption (H57) |