Financial Crises, Monetary Policy and Financial Fragility: A Second-Generation Model of Currency Crises

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3637

Authors: Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger; Benedikt Goderis

Abstract: In this Paper we present a model that combines the second-generation trade-off between costs of maintenance and abandonment with possible balance-sheet problems in the corporate sector. We show how debt levels can move a small economy from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate equilibrium or vice versa, simply by altering the trade-off faced by the monetary authorities. Even if the monetary authorities still have a substantial amount of foreign reserves available to guarantee the fixed value of the currency, they might choose not to and abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. Although it is often argued that first- and second-generation literature have not been able to explain the crisis in East Asia (1997-98), our model suggests that adding corporate balance sheet positions to second-generation models could substantially improve the explanatory power of these models in the case of the Asian crisis.

Keywords: Asian Crisis; Currency Crises; Financial Crises; Financial Fragility; Monetary Policy

JEL Codes: E44; E52


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
higher domestic currency-denominated debt (F65)increase probability of currency crisis (F31)
increase probability of currency crisis (F31)diminish investment and output levels (E22)
higher domestic debt levels (H63)enhance effectiveness of monetary easing (E52)
higher domestic debt levels (H63)increase likelihood of abandoning the peg (F31)
higher foreign debt (F34)increase maintenance costs (R42)
increase maintenance costs (R42)need for stabilization (C62)
higher foreign debt (F34)reduce effectiveness of monetary easing (E52)
reduce effectiveness of monetary easing (E52)less favorable to abandon the fixed exchange rate (F31)
higher foreign debt (F34)increase likelihood of abandoning the peg (F31)

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