Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3605
Authors: Paul Klemperer
Abstract: I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions.(For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading ?How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions? European Economic Review 2002 and at www.paulklemperer.org and ?The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses? Economic Journal 2002 and also at www.paulklemperer.org.)
Keywords: 3G auctions; bidding; spectrum auctions; telecommunications; UMTS
JEL Codes: D44; L96
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Auction Design (D44) | UK 3G Auction Outcome Efficiency (D44) |
| Bidding Behavior of BT and Vodafone (D44) | Auction Dynamics (D44) |
| BT's Competitive Strategy (L19) | Vodafone's Bidding Costs (L96) |
| Auction Rules Complexity (D44) | Suboptimal Bidding Strategies (D44) |