Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3493
Authors: Chiara Fumagalli; Massimo Motta
Abstract: Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might exclude entry of a more efficient competitor, by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers does not exist or is weak enough. Under fierce downstream competition, the incumbent cannot compensate a deviant buyer who buys from the more efficient entrant. Any such buyer will become more competitive and increase their output ? thus triggering entry ? and profits at the expense of buyers who sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent. Hence, exclusive deals cannot deter efficient entry.
Keywords: anticompetitive behaviour; buyers coordination; foreclosure
JEL Codes: K21; L12; L42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| downstream competition (L19) | effectiveness of exclusive contracts in deterring entry (L12) |
| buyer deviation from exclusive contract (L14) | market entry and profits that undermine incumbent's exclusive arrangement (D43) |
| weak downstream competition (L19) | incumbent monopolist excludes more efficient competitor (L12) |