Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3487
Authors: Mathias Dewatripont; Patrick Legros; Steven A. Matthews
Abstract: We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in the realized profit of the firm. All message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria (and no third parties) are considered. Within this class of contracts/equilibria, and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power, debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort. These contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation. If the investor has the bargaining power, the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort. In the latter case, a non-debt simple contract achieves efficiency -- the non-contractibility of effort does not lower welfare. Thus, when the non-contractibility of effort matters, our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics: an early use of debt claims, followed by a switch to equity-like claims.
Keywords: capital structure; convertible debt; moral hazard; renegotiation
JEL Codes: D82; G32; L14
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Debt (H63) | Entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort (L26) |
| Convertible debt (G12) | Entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort (L26) |
| Investor's bargaining power (G24) | Entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort (L26) |
| Debt (H63) | Excessive effort from entrepreneur (L26) |
| Debt (H63) | Optimal outcomes (L21) |
| Convertible debt (G12) | Maintain effort incentives post-effort choice (D91) |