Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3469
Authors: Patrick Legros; Andrew Newman
Abstract: Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to express and easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examples that are of independent interest.
Keywords: assortative matching; contract theory; principal-agent
JEL Codes: D51; I22; J41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| generalized increasing differences (GID) (D50) | positive assortative matching (PAM) (C52) |
| structure of utility functions (D11) | matching outcomes (C52) |
| generalized decreasing differences (GDD) (C69) | negative assortative matching (NAM) (C78) |