Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3404
Authors: Micael Castanheira
Abstract: Voting Theory generally concludes that, in first-past-the-post elections, all votes should go to effective candidates (Duverger?s Law), and parties should adopt a similar platform (Median Voter Theorem). Such predictions are not always met in practice, however. We show why divergence and vote dispersion is a natural outcome when (i) parties are opportunistic, (ii) there is uncertainty on the position of the median voter and (iii) elections are repeated. ?Voting for losers? increases the informational content of elections, and may induce mainstream parties to relocate towards extremists. As a result, to maximize their probability of being elected, they do not adopt median platforms, but instead diverge to a certain extent.
Keywords: Duverger's Law; Poisson Games; Signaling; Voting
JEL Codes: D72; D81
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| vote share of losers (D72) | platforms adopted by mainstream parties (D72) |
| voting for losers (D72) | mainstream parties adjust their platforms (D72) |
| uncertainty about electorate's preferences (D79) | voting for losers (D72) |
| voting for losers (D72) | extreme platforms of mainstream parties (D72) |
| vote share of losers (D72) | mainstream parties incorporate loser's platform (D72) |