Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3372
Authors: David Strömberg
Abstract: This Paper delivers a precise recommendation for how presidential candidates should allocate their resources to maximize the probability of gaining a majority in the Electoral College. A two-candidate, probabilistic-voting model reveals that more resources should be devoted to states which are likely to be decisive in the Electoral College and, at the same time, have very close state elections. The optimal strategies are empirically estimated using state-level opinion polls available in September of the election year. The model?s recommended campaign strategies closely resemble those used in actual campaigns. The Paper also analyses how the allocation of resources would change under the alternative electoral rule of a direct national vote for president.
Keywords: Elections; Political Campaigns; Public Expenditure
JEL Codes: C50; C72; D72; H50; M37
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| presidential candidates allocate resources to states likely to be decisive in the electoral college (D79) | candidates maximize chances of winning electoral votes (D79) |
| probabilistic voting model indicates a direct relationship between resource allocation and the probability of winning electoral votes (D72) | candidates maximize their chances of winning by focusing on close state elections (D79) |
| allocation of resources under electoral college (D72) | allocation strategies differ under direct national vote (D72) |
| actual campaign strategies align closely with model's predictions (D79) | strong causal relationship between model's recommendations and observed campaigning behavior (D79) |