Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3317
Authors: Danny Quah
Abstract: Many cultural products have the same non-rival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face identical difficulties in creation and dissemination. One traditional view says market failure is endemic ? societies tolerate monopolistic inefficiency in intellectual property (IP) protection to incentivize the creation and distribution of intellectual assets. This Paper examines that trade-off in dynamic, representative agent general equilibrium, and characterizes socially efficient creativity. Markets for intellectual assets protected by IP rights can produce too much or too little innovation.
Keywords: cultural good; finitely expansible; innovation; intellectual asset; intellectual property; internet; IP valuation; IPR; knowledge product; MP3; nonrival; software
JEL Codes: D90; O14; O30
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| intellectual property rights (IPRs) (O34) | level of innovation (O35) |
| intellectual property rights (IPRs) (O34) | level of creativity (O36) |
| too much IPRs (O34) | monopolistic inefficiencies (D42) |
| too little IPRs (O34) | fail to incentivize creation (O31) |
| intellectual property rights (IPRs) (O34) | distortion in market outcomes (D43) |
| monopoly rents (D42) | impact on consumer welfare (F61) |