Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3294
Authors: Joseph Francois; Will Martin
Abstract: Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, such as WTO tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of ?market access?, emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat.
Keywords: commercial policy; uncertainty; expected costs of protection; market access; WTO tariff bindings
JEL Codes: F10; F13; F17
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| WTO tariff bindings (F13) | reduced variability of protection rates (G52) |
| reduced variability of protection rates (G52) | lower expected costs of protection (D18) |
| WTO tariff bindings (F13) | lower expected costs of protection (D18) |