Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3215
Authors: Paul Klemperer
Abstract: There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European ?third generation? (3G, or ?MTS?) mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.
Keywords: 3G auctions; bidding; spectrum auctions; telecommunications; UMTS
JEL Codes: D44; L96
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Poor auction designs (D44) | Facilitate collusion (D26) |
| Poor auction designs (D44) | Deter entry (Y60) |
| Deter entry (Y60) | Lower revenues (H29) |
| Facilitate collusion (D26) | Lower revenues (H29) |
| Auction design (D44) | Level of competition (L13) |
| Level of competition (L13) | Revenue generated (H27) |
| Sequencing of auctions (D44) | Market sentiment (G10) |
| Market sentiment (G10) | Bidder behavior (D44) |
| Auction design (D44) | Revenue outcomes (H27) |