Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3214
Authors: Kenneth Binmore; Paul Klemperer
Abstract: This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22½ billion ($34 billion or 2½ % of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus ?beauty contests?, the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.
Keywords: 3G; auctions; bidding; mobile phones; spectrum auctions; telecommunications; UMTS
JEL Codes: D44; L96
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Auction design (D44) | efficient allocation of resources (D61) |
| Auction design (D44) | bidder participation (D44) |
| bidder participation (D44) | auction outcomes (D44) |
| Auction fees (D44) | consumer prices (P22) |
| Auction design (D44) | entry by new bidders (D44) |
| entry by new bidders (D44) | competitive outcome (L13) |
| Auction design (D44) | mitigation of collusion risks (L12) |
| mitigation of collusion risks (L12) | efficient outcome (D61) |
| Auction design (D44) | transparency (G38) |
| transparency (G38) | fair allocation process (D45) |