Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3204
Authors: Jonathan H. Conning; James A. Robinson
Abstract: The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic environment determines organizational form under the assumption of stable property rights to land. The political economy literature has modeled the endogenous determination of property rights. In this Paper we propose a model in which the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the distribution of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from agrarian reform, it may be determined in anticipation of this impact. The model offers a reason for why tenancy, despite its economic advantages, has been so little used in countries where agrarian reform is a salient political issue. We argue that this in particular helps to understand the dearth of tenancy and the relative failure of land reform in Latin America.
Keywords: agrarian organization; land reform; political economy
JEL Codes: D72; N50; O12; Q15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| landlords limit tenancy (R21) | maintain property rights stability (P14) |
| landlords perceive tenancy as a threat to their property rights (P14) | increases likelihood of land reform (Q15) |
| landlords choose to restrict tenancy (R21) | undermines tenants' potential to acquire skills and de facto property rights (P14) |
| undermines tenants' potential to acquire skills and de facto property rights (P14) | reduces extent of land reform (P26) |
| anticipation of land reform (P26) | affects landlords' decisions (R21) |
| landlords' decisions regarding tenancy (R21) | influenced by anticipated political consequences (D72) |
| political factors (P16) | shape agrarian structures (P32) |