Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3139
Authors: Evzen Kocenda
Abstract: This Paper works with a broad data sample of Czech voucher-privatized firms during 1996-99. It analyses the development of ownership structure and consequently its effect on a firm's performance Ownership concentration had been quite high in 1996 and steadily increased. The single largest owner was found to be a decisive shareholder. Industrial companies have been the most stable shareholder and recorded the largest ownership gains. Ownership concentration alone does not explain a change in a firm’s performance and no industry sector was found to have a specific effect on it. We found evidence that several types of owners have an effect on certain performance measures. There does not exist support that type of owner has an effect on a firm's performance in general, however.
Keywords: firm performance; ownership structure; panel data; type of owner; voucher privatization
JEL Codes: C23; D21; G32; L20
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Ownership concentration (G32) | Firm performance (L25) |
| Investment funds (G23) | Growth of total and fixed assets (D25) |
| Individual owners (single largest holders) (G32) | Growth of total assets (G19) |
| Individual owners (cumulative shareholders) (G32) | Growth of fixed assets (D25) |
| Industrial companies (cumulative shareholders) (G32) | Growth of fixed assets (D25) |
| Presence of the state (H70) | Cash flow-equity ratio (G32) |
| Portfolio companies (cumulative shareholders) (G32) | Growth (O00) |