Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3132
Authors: Timothy Besley; Andrea Prat
Abstract: It is widely recognized that active media can play a role in enhancing political competition by informing voters. Collusion between government and media can, however, undermine this role. We extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them. In equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture. We examine evidence both across countries and within India.
Keywords: media capture; government accountability; political competition; media ownership
JEL Codes: D70; H10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| media ownership structures (G32) | political outcomes (D72) |
| higher media concentration (D30) | increased capture likelihood (O36) |
| foreign ownership (F23) | greater efficiency in news production (G14) |
| media freedom (M38) | likelihood of bad incumbents being identified and replaced (D72) |
| likelihood of bad incumbents being identified and replaced (D72) | higher political turnover (D73) |
| higher political turnover (D73) | improved voter welfare (K16) |
| media structure (L82) | political outcomes (D72) |
| media plurality (L32) | safeguard against capture (F52) |
| effectiveness of media (C90) | monitoring government actions (H11) |
| degree of independence from state influence (H77) | effectiveness of media (C90) |
| ownership patterns and market competition (L11) | degree of independence from state influence (H77) |