Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3072
Authors: Tilman Brgers; Christian Dustmann
Abstract: This Paper studies bidding behaviour in the auction of radio spectrum for third generation mobile telephone services which took place in the United Kingdom in the spring of 2000. We show that several companies? bidding behaviour deviates strongly from theoretical predictions. In particular some companies? evaluation of the added advantage of having a large license rather than a small license seemed to change dramatically during the auction for no obvious reason. We conclude that it is less well understood than previously believed how spectrum auctions work, and whether they lead to an efficient allocation of spectrum.
Keywords: private value; simultaneous ascending auction; third generation spectrum auction
JEL Codes: D44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| bidding behaviour (D44) | deviations from private value model (D46) |
| bidding behaviour (D44) | questions about auction efficiency (D44) |
| BT's inconsistent bidding (D44) | questions about private value assumption (D46) |
| deviations from private value model (D46) | auction inefficiency (D44) |