Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP3061
Authors: Enrico C. Perotti; Silvia Rossetto
Abstract: We investigate the timing and the valuation of strategic investment aimed at enhancing entry opportunities in related market segments. As demand is uncertain, entry options should be exercised at the optimal time, trading off the market share gain against the option to wait until more information is revealed, while anticipating competitors' entry behaviour. When the strategic investment grants a strong competitive advantage, the innovator can optimally choose the timing of entry; in case of weaker advantage, the investing firm enters just before its competitor would. In a context of increased uncertainty, the value of waiting to invest rises, but the value of a strategic investment increases even more. In some cases, strategic investment can act as a threat to discourage cross-entry, making parallel monopoly sustainable.
Keywords: entry; growth opportunities; real options; strategic investment; technological innovation
JEL Codes: G12; G31; L11; L13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| strategic investment (G31) | optimal timing of market entry (G14) |
| competitive advantage (L21) | optimal timing of market entry (G14) |
| competitive advantage (L21) | timing of entry (C41) |
| strategic investment (G31) | competitor behavior (L13) |