Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2968
Authors: James Albrecht; Jan C. van Ours
Abstract: This Paper presents a test of the educational signalling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.
Keywords: recruitment; signalling
JEL Codes: I20
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| type of recruitment channel (informal) (J46) | educational standards (I28) |
| education as a signal (J24) | reliance on educational qualifications (I24) |
| type of recruitment channel (informal) (J46) | reliance on educational qualifications (I24) |