Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2925
Authors: Armin Falk; Ernst Fehr; Urs Fischbacher
Abstract: In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
Keywords: common pool resources; experiments; fairness; fairness models; game theory; reciprocity
JEL Codes: C70; C91; C92; D00; D63; H41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| fairness preferences (D63) | appropriation behavior (D16) |
| reciprocal preferences (C71) | efficient resource utilization (D61) |
| absence of communication (Y70) | inefficient outcomes (D61) |
| communication or informal sanctions (Z13) | efficient appropriation behavior (D22) |