Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2890
Authors: Carlo Carraro; Alessandra Pom; Domenico Siniscalco
Abstract: This Paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate arising from the genome case on public versus private research, the Paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterize some features of an optimal research policy.
Keywords: allocation mechanisms; intellectual property rights; science; technology; welfare
JEL Codes: D78; H23; H40; O32; O38
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| knowledge externalities and market failures (D62) | coexistence of science and technology (O30) |
| increase in number of researchers in technology (O39) | increase in competition (L13) |
| increase in competition (L13) | decrease in spillover benefits from science (O39) |
| decrease in spillover benefits from science (O39) | influence on researchers' decisions to switch between institutions (J62) |
| few producers in technology benefiting from science's spillovers (O39) | technology becomes more profitable than science (O39) |
| more researchers enter technology (O36) | incentives shift towards science (O38) |
| socially optimal equilibrium (D51) | coexistence of science and technology (O30) |