Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2830
Authors: Gil S Epstein; Avi Weiss
Abstract: This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and, with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider various extensions such as intertemporal transfers of policing funds, risk-aversion, and ?fuzziness? in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.
Keywords: amnesty; border controls; illegal immigration; immigration; internal controls
JEL Codes: H59; J61; J68
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Government expenditure on immigration control (H56) | Stock of illegal immigrants (K37) |
| Increased spending on border controls (H56) | Reduced flow of illegal immigrants (K37) |
| Spending on internal controls (H76) | Influences stock of illegal immigrants (K37) |
| Amnesty granted (H26) | Increase in stock of legalized immigrants (K37) |
| Expectation of future amnesties (D84) | Encourages more illegal migration (K37) |
| Timing of amnesties (H26) | Higher flow of illegal immigrants (K37) |
| Delayed or limited amnesty (K37) | Some migrants remain illegal (K37) |