Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2721
Authors: Timothy Besley; Robin Burgess
Abstract: The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India. We show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest.
Keywords: Disaster Relief; Government Responsiveness; Mass Media; Newspapers; Political Accountability; Political Agency; Political Economy; Public Food Distribution; Social Protection
JEL Codes: 012; D72; H11; H41; I38; P26
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Informed and politically active electorate (D72) | Government responsiveness (D72) |
| Higher turnout rates (K16) | Government responsiveness (D72) |
| Caste polarization (J15) | Government responsiveness (D72) |
| Higher newspaper circulation (A19) | Government expenditure on public food distribution (H53) |
| Higher newspaper circulation (A19) | Government expenditure on calamity relief (H84) |
| Political competition (D72) | Government responsiveness in election years (D72) |