Market Structure, Trade Liberalization and the GATS

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP2669

Authors: Joseph Francois; Ian Wooton

Abstract: In this Paper we examine the interaction between the different modes of market access commitments in services (cross-border and establishment) market structure, and regulation. In this context, we focus on the impact of improved domestic market access for a foreign service provider on a domestic service market. We work with a model where the domestic industry is assumed to be imperfectly competitive and, as a result of domestic regulation, is able to act as a cartel. We also examine the incentives for the domestic firms to accommodate the entry of the foreign firm by inviting it to join the cartel.

Keywords: Imperfect competition; Market access; Services trade; Trade liberalization

JEL Codes: F12; F13; F23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Improved domestic market access for foreign service providers (L89)Significant changes in the domestic service market (J29)
Entry of a foreign firm (F23)Enhanced competition/Profit shifting (F23)
Foreign firm competing independently (F23)Pro-competitive outcomes (L49)
Foreign firm co-opted into domestic cartel (L12)Negative implications for consumer welfare and market dynamics (F61)
Decreased trade barriers (F19)Foreign firm integrates into domestic cartel/Foreign firm competes independently (F23)
Foreign firm integrates into domestic cartel (L22)Reduced competition and higher prices for consumers (D49)

Back to index